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nonpublic information is illegal, and despite the passage of the 
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Act of 2002, there is still no clear definition of “material, nonpublic 
information.” This Article argues that the ambiguity of what 
constitutes illegal insider information enables corporate insiders to 
engage in profitable transactions without legal consequences. 
Furthermore, we argue and provide evidence that the necessity of 
showing a tipper’s personal benefit creates evidentiary difficulties, 
which, along with the ambiguity of “material, nonpublic 
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INTRODUCTION 
A crackdown on financial fraud over the past fifteen years has led 
to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, and significant 
increases in insider-trading prosecution. 1  The statutory penalties for 
illegal insider trading are almost as severe as those for first degree 
murder, yet some estimate that insiders profit more than $6 billion on 
transactions every year.2 The increase in penalties over this time has 
done little to deter insider trading.3 What is the explanation for this 
paradox? 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Mirela V. Hristova, The Case for Insider-Trading Criminalization and 
Sentencing Reform, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 267, 276-80 (2012) 
 2. Jesse M. Fried, Insider Trading via the Corporation, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 801 
(2014). 
 3. See Hristova, supra note 1, at 276-80 (2012); see also Patrick Augustin, 
Menachem Brenner & Marti G. Subrahmanyam, Informed Options Trading Prior to 
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Even though more than eighty years have passed since the 
enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange 
Act”), prohibiting fraud in the purchase or sale of any security,4 and 
more than fifty years have passed since Cady, Roberts held that insider 
trading on material, nonpublic information is illegal,5 neither the United 
States Congress nor the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (the “SEC”) has provided a clear definition of the phrase 
“material, nonpublic information.” In the case of litigation, courts have 
typically found insider trades made immediately prior to the disclosure 
of corporate takeovers, earnings announcements, or dividend 
announcements to be unlawful.6 Immediately is generally interpreted as 
meaning within days or hours of an announcement by the firm. 
However, it is much less clear whether trading one month before an 
announcement is legal. Equally unclear is the legality of trading on other 
types of valuable information, such as corporate structuring, new 
security issues, corporate borrowing decisions, or personnel changes, all 
of which can significantly impact stock prices. 7  We argue that the 
ambiguity of the term “material, nonpublic information” enables 
corporate insiders to engage in problematic, profitable transactions 
without legal consequence. 
Over the past thirty years, Congress has responded to public 
concern over increased insider trading by passing legislation that has 
repeatedly increased the penalties upon conviction. In 1984, Congress 
passed the Insider Trading Sanctions Act (“ITSA”),8 followed by the 
                                                                                                                 
M&A Announcements: Insider Trading? (Oct. 26, 2015) (unpublished working paper), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2441606 [http://perma.cc/7H6R-Q 
NLM]. 
 4. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); see 
also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015). 
 5. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), 1961 WL 60638. 
 6. See Lisa K. Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47 J. 
FIN. 1661, 1663 (1992) (noting that insider trading is associated with immediate price 
movements and quick price discovery). 
 7. See e.g., Karl-Adam Bonnier & Robert F. Bruner, An Analysis of Stock Price 
Reaction to Management Change in Distressed Firms, 11 J. ACCT. & ECON. 95 (1989); 
Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Corporate Disclosure, a Murky Definition of Material, 
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 5, 2011, 5:57 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/ 
05/in-corporate-disclosure-a-murky-definition-of-material/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/4TB3 
-GYS9]. 
 8. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264. 
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Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act (“ITSFEA”)9 in 
1988, and the Sarbanes Oxley Act (“SOX”)10 in 2002. Currently, the 
penalties from insider trading can reach up to twenty years in prison and 
up to $1 million in fines for each offense. 11  Despite increased 
congressional action to address issues stemming from insider trading, 
the legislature has yet to define clearly what exactly constitutes illegal 
insider information. 
This matter is further complicated by Newman,12 a recent decision 
by the Second Circuit that endorses a strict interpretation of the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Dirks v. SEC requiring a showing of personal benefit 
to insider-tippers before attaching liability to tippees. 13  More 
specifically, in order to establish tippee liability, the Second Circuit now 
requires the government to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
tippee knew that an insider disclosed confidential information and that 
he did so in exchange for a personal benefit.”14 This ruling significantly 
raises the bar for establishing liability because traders can evade the 
requirement by adding additional layers between the original tipper and 
the eventual tippee. We argue that the additional ambiguity created by 
Newman, which was recently denied certiorari, 15  will lead to an 
increased frequency and profitability of insider trading to the detriment 
of the investing public and its confidence in public markets. 
We therefore advocate for a clearer definition of “material, 
nonpublic information.” Increasing civil and criminal penalties does not 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100- 704, 102 Stat. 4677. 
 10. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 11. See Hristova supra note 1, at 279-80. 
 12. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 13. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983) (holding that derivative (tippee) 
liability can only be found where the insider-tipper “personally will benefit, directly or 
indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of 
duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative 
breach.”). In Dirks, the insider-tipper shared personal information with an analyst (the 
defendant) in order to expose an insurance scam being perpetrated by the tipper’s 
company. Id. at 648-49. 
 14. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 442. 
 15. United States v. Newman, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015) (denying certiorari); see also 
Ed Beeson, SEC Loses Insider Trading Case on Home Court, LAW360 (Sept. 14, 2015, 
3:44 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/702227/sec-loses-insider-trading-case-on-ho 
me-court [http://perma.cc/7TKY-CB2V]. 
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work as a successful deterrent if there is substantial ambiguity about 
what constitutes illegal insider trading. This ambiguity allows insiders to 
not only trade successfully, but also to fend off attempts by private 
litigants, the SEC, and the U.S. Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) to 
discipline them after the fact. The evidence presented in this Article 
confirms our hypothesis and shows that insider trading has become 
increasingly prevalent while the threat of sanctions continues to weaken. 
To achieve a clearer definition, we urge the courts, the SEC, and 
Congress to adopt an evidentiary presumption. Our proposed 
presumption is simple, easy to implement, and difficult for insiders to 
circumvent. It provides that a prima facie case of trading on material, 
nonpublic information be found upon proof that (1) the information 
giving rise to the trade is of the type that requires an 8-K filing by the 
corporation, (2) its announcement leads to statistically significant 
abnormal stock returns,16 and (3) the insider trading has occurred within 
two months prior to the announcement of the information. Given that 
corporations file 10-Q and 10-K reports every three months, these 
conditions, in effect, require that all insider trading based on 10-Q and 
10-K information be confined to approximately a one-month window 
after each earnings announcement.17 If all three conditions are satisfied, 
then the burden of proof must shift to the insiders to show that the 
particular transaction does not meet the material, nonpublic information 
requirement. Furthermore, any tipping by insiders of any information 
satisfying these three conditions must again shift the burden of proof to 
defendants to show that their tip should be exempted.18 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Standard deviation of stock returns for a typical publically listed company is 
about 50% per year or about 3.3% per day. This means that to be statistically significant 
at the 5% level, the announcement must lead to a stock price change of 7% or greater 
on the announcement day. 
 17. Typically, two to three days after earnings announcements is also considered a 
black-out period to allow markets to fully digest the earnings information. This, in 
effect, confines insider trading to the four-week period after each earnings 
announcement. 
 18. This proposal is based, in part, on evidence that information disclosed in Form 
8-K filings provides new and material information to the public. Recent research shows 
that 15,419 transactions executed by insiders during the four business days prior to the 
filing of Form 8-K reports exhibit statistically significant abnormal trading profits of 42 
basis points. This finding indicates that insiders can and do exploit the new information 
contained in 8-K reports. See Alma Cohen, Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Joshua R. Mitts, 
The 8-K Trading Gap (Sept. 7, 2015) (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 
524, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2657877 [http://perma. 
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Of course, this evidentiary presumption does not cover all possible 
instances of insider trading, as it is not intended to be comprehensive. 
For instance, insiders may trade on material, nonpublic information, but 
still end up losing money due to unexpected circumstances. Insiders 
may also exploit long-lived information beyond two months. Our 
objective is to provide a prima facie presumption of what is always 
considered material, nonpublic information, similar to Rule 14e-3 
(described below), which declares takeover-related information to 
always be material and nonpublic. We recognize that other types of 
trading may still fall in a gray area, which will need to be resolved 
through a fact-finding process. 
We expect additional clarity will allow all insiders who want to be 
on the safe side of the law to ensure that their transactions do not meet 
any of the conditions set forth above. Insiders already know which 
events trigger an 8-K filing. By not trading or tipping during the two-
month window preceding an upcoming 8-K filing, insiders can easily 
ensure that at least two of the three conditions will not be satisfied. The 
benefit of this additional clarity should enable courts to separate routine 
insider trading from opportunistic trading and increase the confidence in 
the public equity markets. 
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part I 
discusses the development of insider trading law, and recent 
developments in materiality of insider trading information, including the 
role of the Newman decision. Part II outlines the numerous criminal and 
civil penalties imposed upon the undefined offense of insider trading. 
Part III describes our proposal for a new evidentiary presumption, and 
discusses the potential effects of the Newman decision in establishing 
liability under insider trading laws. In Part IV, we argue that insiders 
exploit the vagueness in the statutes to engage in profitable transactions, 
and as a result, the profitability of insiders’ transactions is itself a 
measure of the ineffectiveness of the insider trading laws. We also 
present evidence on time-series profitability of historical insider trading 
to gauge the deterrence effect of the insider trading laws. This Article 
then sums up our findings and presents our conclusions. 
                                                                                                                 
cc/YSC4-TKL2]. 
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I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSIDER TRADING LAW 
Insider trading is not defined in federal securities laws. Therefore, 
the courts are left to interpret whether a trade is fraudulent, which 
requires a determination of whether the information used was material 
and nonpublic. The lack of a statutory or regulatory definition in this 
respect is troublesome and out of line with many jurisdictions across the 
Atlantic.19 In the United States, the offense is based on interpretations, 
both judicial and administrative, of the antifraud provisions in Section 
10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5.20 While state causes of 
action and liability for securities fraud existed long before either was 
enacted,21 serious federal involvement did not begin until 1961, when 
the SEC argued in Cady, Roberts that federal antifraud provisions 
should extend to cover insider trading.22 The crime is either criminal or 
civil, and has been interpreted by the courts as requiring intent.23 
According to the SEC, insider trading “generally occurs when a 
security is bought or sold in breach of a fiduciary duty or other 
relationship of trust and confidence while in possession of material, 
nonpublic information.”24 “Inside information” is generally understood 
to be “nonpublic information about events or circumstances related to a 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See Edward Greene & Olivia Schmid, Duty Free Insider Trading?, 2013 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 369, 372, 424 (2013). In the European Union, for example, the 
offense is defined in a statutory directive, the Market Abuse Directive. The Directive is 
detailed and the crime is premised on the concept of parity of information without a 
requirement of deception or misleading conduct, or breach of a fiduciary duty or any 
similar relationship of trust and/or confidence. Id. at 372. The SEC lobbied for a similar 
parity-of-information approach, but this approach was rejected in Chiarella, where the 
Supreme Court found it too broad in scope because Rule 10b-5 is based on fraud. See 
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233-34 (1980). The parity-of-information 
approach is focused on the information, not how the person obtains it from his or her 
source, and does not involve criminal intent. The United States has not adopted this 
approach and continues to suffer from lack of clear definitions of insider trading. 
 20. See Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 
(2015). 
 21. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Insider Trading, Investor Harm, and Executive 
Compensation, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 291, 293 (1999). 
 22. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), 1961 WL 60638; Thompson, 
supra note 21, at 293. 
 23. See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227-28. 
 24. See SEC Enforcement Actions: Insider Trading Cases, SEC, http://www.sec.go 
v/spotlight/insidertrading/cases.shtml [http://perma.cc/B6B3-WRR2] (last modified Jan. 
28, 2015). 
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company’s assets or earning power known only to corporate 
management and its confidants, and which can reasonably be expected 
to have a material effect on the company’s share price.”25 
Not all insider trading cases involve this type of information, 
however. Some concern trading by professionals on nonpublic market 
information, and others include “tipping” this information to others. The 
SEC defines information as being material if its release could affect the 
company’s stock price. The SEC definitions and rules are generally 
broader than the limited rulings of the courts. This part will describe in 
detail how the legal landscape for insider trading has developed through 
both regulation and caselaw. 
A.  LACK OF STATUTORY CLARITY 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use 
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the 
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange— 
. . . . 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security 
not so registered, or any securities-based swap agreement[,] any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors.26 
SEC Rule 10b-5 similarly states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use 
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the 
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Roberta S. Karmel, The Law on Insider Trading Lacks Needed Definition, 68 
SMU L. REV. 757 (2015). 
 26. Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
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(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.27 
It is notable that neither the statute nor the regulatory rule even 
utilize the phrase “insider trading,” let alone define it. Instead, insider 
trading has been considered fraud, covered by the above statute and rule, 
through court interpretation.28 
Historically, the SEC and Congress have not agreed on the 
definition of insider trading. The SEC resisted defining insider trading in 
fear that a definition would enable more fraud.29 Therefore, it has passed 
rules to clarify the borders of what the crime constitutes based on the 
court decisions on the matter throughout the years. When the United 
States Senate 30  and the United States House of Representatives 31 
attempted to define insider trading with proposed bills in 1987, the SEC 
proposed its own bill. 32  These bills, however, adopted different 
approaches. Whereas the Senate and SEC gave contemporaneous traders 
the ability to recover damages, the House put forward a criminal 
statute.33 
                                                                                                                 
 27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015). 
 28. See, e.g., Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), 1961 WL 60638 (the 
first decision to hold that Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 apply 
to insider trading); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 (1980) (the first Supreme Court case to 
hold that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cover insider trading). 
 29. See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, Judge, PLI Securities Regulation Institute Keynote 
Address: Is the S.E.C. Becoming a Law unto Itself? (Nov. 5, 2014), http://securitiesdiar 
y.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/rakoff-pli-speech.pdf [http://perma.cc/XMW3-Z5GD] 
(noting that the SEC “has repeatedly resisted any effort by Congress to statutorily 
define insider trading, preferring to leave the concept sufficiently flexible as to be able 
to adjust to new developments”); Jill E. Fisch, Letter to the Editor, The Muddle of 
Insider Trading Regulation, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/199 
1/11/24/business/l-the-muddle-of-insider-trading-regulation-101791.html [http://perma. 
cc/RQC8-TFAH]. 
 30. S. 1380, 100th Cong. (1987). 
 31. H.R. 1238, 100th Cong. (1987). 
 32. See Karmel, supra note 25, at 766. 
 33. H.R. 1238. 
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The Senate bill would have considered “information [to have been] 
used or obtained wrongfully only if it [had] been obtained by, or its use 
would constitute, directly or indirectly, theft, conversion, 
misappropriation or a breach of any fiduciary, contractual, employment, 
personal or other relationship of trust and confidence.”34 The SEC, on 
the other hand, wanted to outlaw trading while in possession of material, 
nonpublic information if that information “has been obtained by, or its 
communication would constitute, directly or indirectly (A) theft, 
bribery, misrepresentation, espionage (through electronic or other 
means) or (B) conversion, misappropriation, or any other breach of any 
personal or other relationship of trust and confidence, or breach of any 
contractual or employment relationship.”35 This change to “possession” 
without an accompanying “use” resulted in no action being taken by 
Congress until the ITSFEA, 36  which increased the sanctions for the 
crime, but failed to provide any help in defining insider trading.37 
B.  DEFINING INSIDER TRADING THROUGH THE COURTS 
In large part due to the lack of statutory clarity, the courts have 
found it necessary to shape the boundaries of what constitutes illegal 
insider information through caselaw. In Cady, Roberts, the first insider 
trading case under Rule 10b-5, the SEC found that a broker-dealer’s 
liability derived from the conduct of one of its principals, a director of a 
corporation that decided to make a dividend cut.38 The SEC held that the 
director had violated Rule 10b-5 when, soon after leaving the board 
meeting where he had learned of the dividend cut, he sold the securities 
of that corporation held in customer accounts of the broker-dealer, 
including those in which he had a beneficial interest. 39  The SEC 
emphasized the existence of a relationship, which gave the director 
access to inside information only intended for a corporate purpose, and 
                                                                                                                 
 34. S. 1380, at 3. 
 35. See Karmel, supra note 25, at 766 (citing Accompanying Letter, and Analysis 
by Ad Hoc Legislation Committee, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1817 (Nov. 27, 
1987)). 
 36. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-704, 102 Stat. 4677. 
 37. See Karmel, supra note 25, at 766. 
 38. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), 1961 WL 60638, at *1. 
 39. Id. at *4. 
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the unfairness of allowing him to take advantage of this information by 
trading without disclosure.40 
In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Second Circuit adopted this view when 
it affirmed an injunction against an issuer, its officers, and its employees 
disallowing them from trading and tipping others to trade stocks and 
options based on insider information concerning a large copper strike by 
the issuer in Canada.41 The court rooted its decision in the theory that 
investors trading on impersonal exchanges should have similar access to 
material information.42 In this case, and in those following, the SEC 
would argue that in the public securities markets, Rule 10b-5 requires a 
parity of information among traders.43 
In Investors Management, investment advisers and mutual fund 
managers sold stock in a company because of a selective disclosure 
from the underwriter of the company’s debentures of a reduction in its 
earnings.44 The SEC held that anyone who obtains insider information, 
“which he has reason to know emanates from a corporate source, and 
which by itself places him in a position superior to other investors, 
thereby acquires a relationship with respect to that information within 
the purview and restraints of [Rule 10b-5].”45 Commissioner Smith’s 
concurring opinion further stated that the tippee must know that “the 
information was given to him in breach of a duty by a person having a 
special relationship to the issuer” and the information must have 
substantially contributed to the trading at hand.46 The case exemplifies 
the two main questions of the debate: (1) whether possession of insider 
information is enough for a violation, or if it also has to be used, and (2) 
whether the tippee trading on the information must know that it was 
given in breach of a duty by someone with a special relationship with 
the company in question in which he or she cannot disclose this 
information.47 This concurring opinion would resonate in a later ruling 
of the Supreme Court. 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id. 
 41. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 42. Id. at 849. 
 43. Karmel, supra note 25, at 759. 
 44. See Investors Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971), 1971 WL 120505, at *2-3. 
 45. See Karmel, supra note 25, at 760 (citing Investors Mgmt., 1971 WL 120505, 
at *8). 
 46. See Karmel, supra note 25, at 760. 
 47. See id. 
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Almost a decade later in Chiarella, the Supreme Court rejected this 
parity of information theory, stating that not every case of financial 
unfairness violates Rule 10b-5.48 In this case, the Court reversed the 
conviction of an employee of a financial printing house who, upon 
learning of upcoming tender offers for a few target companies, 
purchased shares in those companies in order to sell them at a profit 
after the tender offers were announced.49  Because the names of the 
companies were not well disguised, the employee was able to ascertain 
their names on his own and, thus, was not tipped. Noting this, the Court 
held that “silence in connection with the purchase or sale of securities 
may operate as a fraud” only if “liability is premised upon a duty to 
disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence.”50 
Apart from its majority opinion, the case also generated an 
important dissent from Chief Justice Warren Burger, which helped to 
shape the development of insider trading law. In his dissent, he stated 
that the general rule that does not require parties to an arm’s length 
business transaction to disclose information, in the absence of a 
confidential or fiduciary relation, 
permits a businessman to capitalize on his experience and skill in 
securing and evaluating relevant information; it provides incentive 
for hard work, careful analysis, and astute forecasting. But the 
policies that underlie the rule also should limit its scope. In 
particular, the rule should give way when an informational 
advantage is obtained, not by superior experience, foresight, or 
industry, but by some unlawful means.51 
In the 5-4 decision, the majority of the Justices presumably 
supported the misappropriation doctrine.52 
In response to their defeat in Chiarella, the SEC passed Rule 14e-
3.53 Rule 14e-3 creates a “disclose or abstain” from trading requirement 
for anyone who (1) possesses material information concerning a tender 
offer, and (2) knows or has reason to know the information is nonpublic 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231-32 (1980). 
 49. Id. at 224-25. 
 50. Id. at 230. 
 51. Id. at 239-40 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
 52. See Karmel, supra note 25, at 760-61 (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222). 
 53. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2015). 
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and derived from the offeror or target company.54 The SEC regards this 
as a prophylactic rule and argues that neither scienter nor breach of duty 
is required to trigger a violation.55  This rule proved to be useful in 
prosecutions involving advance knowledge of tender offers; in fact, both 
the SEC and the DOJ prosecuted a number of cases under this rule on 
the basis of the misappropriation theory.56 
The courts have also been faced with determining how to define 
insider trading under the various theories within the context of tippees. 
The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the equal access or parity of 
information theory in Dirks, and overturned the SEC’s sanctions against 
Raymond Dirks by finding that a tippee’s liability is derivative.57 Dirks, 
an insurance company analyst, received information from a former 
officer of a company and began an independent investigation whereby 
he discovered that the company was engaging in large-scale fraud.58 
After Dirks told his clients and other potential clients about his findings, 
many sold their shares of the company. The Court rejected the SEC’s 
argument that when tippees come into knowledge of material 
information they know is confidential, they must publicly disclose it or 
abstain from trading.59 Instead, the court held that a tippee is only liable 
if the tipper breached a fiduciary duty by receiving a personal benefit via 
the tip.60 
Following the ruling, the SEC attempted to distinguish the case of 
Stevens from Dirks.61 In Stevens, a CEO made a number of unsolicited 
calls to some securities analysts to tell them the soon-to-be announced 
quarterly results would be lower than expected.62 The SEC argued that, 
                                                                                                                 
 54. See id. 
 55. See Karmel, supra note 25, at 761 n.33 (citing Tender Offers, 45 Fed. Reg. 
60,410 (Sept. 4, 1980)). 
 56. See Karmel, supra note 25, at 761; see also Steginsky v. Xcelera Inc., 741 F.3d 
365, 370 (2d Cir. 2014) (reversing the trial court’s dismissal of insider trading charges 
where defendants allegedly traded on information concerning a planned tender offer); 
SEC v. Jacobs, No. 1:13-CV-1289 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 2013) (denying defendants’ 
motion for judgment as a matter of law where downstream tippees allegedly traded on 
information concerning a planned tender offer). 
 57. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983). 
 58. See id. at 648-50. 
 59. See id. at 653-54. 
 60. See id. 
 61. SEC v. Stevens, Litigation Release No. 12,813, 48 S.E.C. Docket 739, 1991 
WL 296537, at *1 (Mar. 19, 1991). 
 62. See id. 
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through his selective disclosure, the CEO attempted to benefit by 
enhancing his reputation and managerial status.63 Following a settlement 
in the case, the SEC adopted Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Regulation 
FD”), which imposes a duty on public companies that disclose insider 
information to analysts or others in the industry to simultaneously 
disclose that information publicly.64 
The courts and the SEC also do not agree on the interpretation of 
situations involving the tipping of family members by insiders. For 
example, in Chestman, a husband tipped a stockbroker based on 
information he had received from his wife, who had received it through 
a line of family members, starting with a family member who was a 
corporate insider.65 The stockbroker was prosecuted in the matter, but 
the Second Circuit overturned the conviction under Section 10(b),66 
arguing that a family relationship is not a sufficient basis to establish the 
fiduciary relationship necessary based on Chiarella and Dirks. 67 
Following this holding, the SEC passed Rule 10b5-2, which establishes 
that “(3) whenever a person receives or obtains material, nonpublic 
information from his or her spouse, parent, child or sibling; provided, 
however, that the person receiving or obtaining the information may 
demonstrate that no duty of trust or confidence existed with respect to 
the information,” he or she has a duty of trust and confidence under the 
misappropriation theory.68 
Disagreement among the circuit courts regarding the interpretation 
of the causal connection between a trader’s possession of insider 
information and his or her trading has only contributed to the confusion. 
For example, the Second Circuit held in Teicher that “knowing 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Id. 
 64. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2015). Regulation FD cannot lead to private damages 
suits or criminal prosecution, as it is not promulgated under Sections 10(b) or 14 of the 
Exchange Act. Regulation FD provides in pertinent part, that “[w]henever an issuer, or 
any person acting on its behalf, discloses any material nonpublic information regarding 
that issuer or its securities to [a broker, dealer, investment adviser, investment 
company, or holder of the issuer’s securities], the issuer shall make public disclosure of 
that information: (1) [s]imultaneously, in the case of an intentional disclosure; and (2) 
[p]romptly, in the case of a non-intentional disclosure.” Id. § 243.100(a), (b)(1). 
 65. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 555 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc). 
 66. He was convicted under Rule 14e-3, however. Id. at 554. 
 67. See id. at 571. 
 68. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2. 
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possession” is sufficient to establish insider trading liability.69 Yet, in 
Adler, the Eleventh Circuit found that “use” is required.70 In Smith, the 
Ninth Circuit required a proof of “use” in a criminal case because 
criminal intent cannot be based on a legal presumption. 71  The SEC 
answered the question by passing Rule 10b5-1, which establishes that 
trading “on the basis” of insider information means the trader “was 
aware of” the information when the trade was made.72 
The Supreme Court again dealt with insider trading in O’Hagan, 
where the Court reinstated a criminal conviction under Rules 10b-5 and 
14e-3 of a lawyer who traded in the securities of a target company when 
the bidder was a client of the lawyer’s firm. 73  This holding further 
advanced the Court’s agreement with the misappropriation theory, and 
found that the SEC can “regulate nondeceptive activities as a reasonably 
designed means of preventing manipulative acts” under Section 14(e).74 
Following many victories for the SEC and the DOJ, both have 
prosecuted insider trading more robustly. The SEC alone has prosecuted 
almost 600 defendants in civil insider trading cases over the past five 
years.75 
C.  THE AMBIGUITY OF DEFINING “MATERIAL, NONPUBLIC 
INFORMATION” 
In addition to the law’s imprecision in detailing the acts that 
constitute insider trading, there is also no clear answer as to what 
constitutes “material, nonpublic information.” In general, “material” 
information is information that fits into one or more of the following 
categories: (1) there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor 
would consider the information as important in making his or her 
                                                                                                                 
 69. See United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 70. See SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 71. See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 72. See 17 C.F.R. §240.10b5-1. 
 73. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1997). 
 74. Id. at 666-73. 
 75. See Andrew Ceresney, Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC, Testimony on 
“Oversight of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement” (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.sec.gov 
/news/testimony/031915-test.html [http://perma.cc/8Z4L-VW2F]. 
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investment decisions,76 (2) the disclosure of such information would be 
“viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 
‘total mix’ of information made available,”77 or (3) the disclosure of the 
information is “reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the 
market price of the security.”78 
The SEC defines information as “nonpublic” when investors “may 
not lawfully acquire [it] without the consent of the source,” or when the 
information may be lawfully disseminated, but has not been made 
available to investors generally. 79 According to the SEC, insiders must 
wait a “reasonable” amount of time after disclosure before trading, and 
what constitutes a “reasonable” amount of time depends on the 
circumstances of the disclosure.80 
The courts, in contrast, have focused more on the “material” 
portion of the test. The basic test for materiality was established in List 
v. Fashion Park, Inc., in which the court held that the materiality of the 
information rests on “whether a reasonable man would attach 
importance [to the information] in determining his choice of action in 
the transaction in question.”81 This includes any information that “in 
reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value of the 
corporation’s stock or securities.” 82  Material information also 
encompasses “those facts which affect the probable future of the 
company and those which may affect the desire of investors to buy, sell, 
or hold the company’s securities.”83 
                                                                                                                 
 76. See JOINT MARKET PRACTICES FORUM, STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE HANDLING OF MATERIAL NONPUBLIC 
INFORMATION BY CREDIT MARKET PARTICIPANTS 4 (2003), http://www.isda.org/c_and_ 
a/pdf/jmpfStatement.pdf [http://perma.cc/B9MZ-65DA]. 
 77. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., 
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
 78. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 166 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing 
SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 15 (2d Cir. 1977)). 
 79. See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under 
the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 322 n.2 (1979). 
 80. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,721 n.40 
(Aug. 24, 2000) (citing Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249 (1973), 1973 WL 149283, at *6) 
(adopting release for Regulation FD and Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2). 
 81. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 82. Id. at 462 (quoting Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963); 
see also Kronfeld v. Trans World Airlines, Inc, 832 F.2d 726, 732 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 83. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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The determination of materiality is fact-specific; hence, the same 
information may be material or non-material depending on the 
circumstances. 84  In practice, certain factors seem to satisfy the 
materiality test easily. For example, the Chartered Financial Analyst 
(“CFA”) guidelines generally include the following information as 
material: dividend increase, decrease, or omission; quarterly earnings of 
sales considerably different from consensus; gain or loss of a major 
client; changes in management; important developments within the 
industry; government reports of economic trends; large acquisition or 
divestiture; and when an offer is made to tender shares.85 Courts often 
cite the market price impact of the information and the source of the 
information in support of a finding of materiality. A court is more likely 
to find the information material when the source of the information is 
reliable.86 
On numerous occasions, the courts have found that confidential 
information about tender offers can be material, nonpublic information. 
The following cases were discussed in Part I.B in the context of how the 
act of insider trading has been interpreted. This discussion will highlight 
the aspects of those cases that relate to the courts’ attempts to define 
“material, nonpublic information.” 
In Chestman, the Second Circuit held that “[o]ne violates Rule 14e-
3(a) if he trades on the basis of material, nonpublic information 
concerning a pending tender offer that he knows or has reason to know 
has been acquired ‘directly or indirectly’ from an insider of the offeror 
or issuer, or someone working on their behalf.”87 This case involved a 
husband who tipped a stockbroker based on information that his wife 
received from her family members.88 The court found that the husband’s 
statement to the broker that the corporation would be sold at a 
“substantially higher” price than its market value was material, 
nonpublic information.89 
In O’Hagan, the Supreme Court held that a lawyer who had 
knowledge of a tender offer of the corporation his firm was representing 
was in possession of material, nonpublic information.90 James O’Hagan 
                                                                                                                 
 84. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988). 
 85. See CFA INST., STANDARDS OF PRACTICE HANDBOOK 59-61 (11th ed., 2014). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc). 
 88. See id. at 555. 
 89. See id. at 564. 
 90. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997). 
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was a partner in a law firm that was retained as local counsel to 
represent Grand Metropolitan PLC (“Grand Met”) in a potential tender 
offer for the common stock of the Pillsbury Company.91 O’Hagan did 
not do any work on the representation of the company and the firm 
withdrew from representing the company less than a month before the 
tender offer became public. 92  While the firm was still representing 
Grand Met, O’Hagan began to purchase call options of Pillsbury stock, 
giving him rights to purchase additional shares.93 By the time the tender 
offer became public, he owned 2500 unexpired options, which was more 
than any other individual investor.94 As the stock price shot up, O’Hagan 
sold his call options and common stock at a profit of more than $4.3 
million. 95  Accordingly, the SEC began an investigation into these 
transactions alleging that O’Hagan defrauded his law firm and its client, 
Grand Met, by using material, nonpublic information regarding the 
planned tender offer for personal trading purposes.96 A jury convicted 
O’Hagan on all fifty-seven counts, but a divided panel of the Eighth 
Circuit reversed these convictions. 97  The Supreme Court, however, 
reversed the ruling of the Eighth Circuit and held that under Rule 14e-
3(a), it is unlawful to trade based on material, nonpublic information 
that concerns a tender offer where the person knows or should know that 
the information was acquired from an insider of the offeror or issuer, or 
someone working on their behalf, unless such information and its source 
are publicly disclosed within a reasonable time before any purchase or 
sale.98 
In Chiarella, the Supreme Court held that an employee of a 
financial printing house that printed takeover bids was in possession of 
material, nonpublic information when he deduced the names of the 
target companies (based on the information contained in documents 
delivered to the printer) and purchased stock in the target companies.99 
In this case, however, the individual did not have a duty to disclose 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 648. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 649. 
 98. Id. at 666-69. 
 99. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231, 236 (1980). 
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because he had no fiduciary duties to, or specific relationships with, the 
shareholders in the corporation. 100  Nevertheless, the information he 
possessed was considered to be material and nonpublic despite the Court 
holding that he was not liable for trading on that information.101 
Knowledge of confidential facts that could have a significant 
impact on the price of the company’s stock can also constitute material, 
nonpublic information. In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the defendants had 
knowledge of confidential information regarding Texas Gulf Sulphur’s 
(“TGS”) drilling activities in Timmins, Ontario when such information 
was not publicly available, and a few of the defendants had disclosed 
this information to others for use. 102  TGS had discovered a very 
prosperous mining area where the discovery hole was referred to by one 
mining publication as “one of the most impressive drill holes completed 
in modern times.”103 The Second Circuit disagreed with the trial judge 
and found that the knowledge of TGS’s discovery hole would have been 
important to a reasonable investor and could have affected the price of 
stock; therefore, it was material information.104 Furthermore, the Court 
stated that an important factor in determining whether this information 
was material was “the importance attached to the drilling results by 
those who knew about it.”105 
Similarly, in Adler, the Eleventh Circuit held that an executive and 
board member of a company was in possession of material, nonpublic 
information when he was told at a board meeting that the company 
would be receiving fewer orders from one of its largest customers.106 In 
addition, the Second Circuit held in Teicher that the defendant, a 
principal of Drexel, a securities firm, possessed material, nonpublic 
information when he received the names of the companies on the Drexel 
“phantom list.”107 The list contained the names of companies Drexel 
would not be able to trade in because the firm was working on 
transactions involving these companies.108 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. at 232-33. 
 101. Id. at 235. 
 102. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 840-42 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 103. See id. at 850. 
 104. See id. 
 105. Id. at 851. 
 106. See SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 107. See United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1993). 
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The information can also be “soft,” and still be found material. In 
Smith, the Ninth Circuit explained that “soft” information means 
forward-looking information such as the “forecasts of future sales and 
revenue.” 109  The court held that “‘soft’ information can, under the 
proper circumstances, be ‘material’ within the meaning of Rule 10b-
5.”110 
Lastly, information about fraudulent corporate practices can also be 
material information. In Dirks, the officer of a New York broker-dealer 
firm received information about a corporation from one of its former 
officers alleging that it had overstated its assets due to fraudulent 
corporate practices.111 He urged Dirks to verify the alleged fraud and to 
disclose it publicly.112 Dirks began an investigation and discussed his 
findings with investors and clients, which resulted in a number of large 
investment advisers liquidating their holdings of more than $16 million 
in the company’s stock. 113  As a result, the corporation’s stock fell 
dramatically.114 The Court found that the information of fraud shared by 
Dirks was material, nonpublic information.115 
D.  TIPPEE DERIVATIVE LIABILITY, “PERSONAL BENEFIT,” AND NEWMAN 
Although it is clear that the ambiguity as to what type of acts and 
information constitute insider trading and give rise to liability is 
pervasive, the following section will discuss in more depth how this 
ambiguity has affected the development of tippee liability.  
The Court in Dirks rejected the view of the SEC that a tippee has a 
duty to abstain from trading simply because he has received material, 
nonpublic information from an insider.116 Instead, in order for a tippee to 
be held liable for trading on material, nonpublic information, the tipper 
must have breached her duty “before the tippee inherits the duty to 
disclose or abstain.”117 As the Dirks Court explained, because there are 
                                                                                                                 
 109. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1064 (1988). 
 110. Id. at 1065. 
 111. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 648-49 (1983). 
 112. Id. at 649. 
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 114. Id. at 650. 
 115. Id. at 649-51. 
 116. Id. at 656-58. 
 117. See id. at 664. 
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many legitimate reasons why an insider might disclose material, 
nonpublic information, the test for insider breach “is whether the insider 
personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.”118 
Accordingly, personal benefit may be satisfied in many ways, including 
by proof of pecuniary benefits, reputational benefits that will promote 
future earnings, the benefit associated with “mak[ing] a gift of 
confidential information to a trading relative or friend,” or even the mere 
existence of a relationship between the insider and tippee that suggests a 
quid pro quo arrangement.119 Absent some personal gain, there has been 
no breach of duty by the insider,120 and absent a breach by the insider, 
there is no derivative breach. 121  Moreover, because the antifraud 
provisions of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 require scienter,122 in order 
for tippee liability to exist, a tippee must also know or have reason to 
know that the tipper has disclosed in breach of a duty of confidence.123 
Negligent disclosure of information, therefore, is not sufficient. 124 
Whether recklessness is sufficient remains open to debate. The circuits 
are split on this question and the Supreme Court has yet to address it.125 
The federal courts also remain divided as to whether, and the extent 
to which, a tippee-violator must be aware of a personal benefit received 
by the tipper. As noted above, some courts are content to infer that a 
tippee was complicit in the tipper’s breach simply on the basis of a 
preexisting relationship between the two. Others, like the Second Circuit 
in Newman, appear to require much more.126 In December of 2012, Todd 
                                                                                                                 
 118. See id. at 662. 
 119. See id. at 664. 
 120. Id. at 662. 
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 122. Liability for securities fraud requires proof of scienter, defined as “a mental 
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” See Ernst & Ernst v. 
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Newman and Anthony Chiasson were found guilty of committing 
securities fraud in violation of Sections 10(b) and 32 of the Exchange 
Act and SEC Rules 10b-5 and 10b5-2, as well as of conspiring to 
commit securities fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 371. 127  Newman and 
Chiasson traded on material, nonpublic information received third and 
fourth hand from insiders at Dell and NVIDIA. 128  Newman and 
Chiasson argued that neither knew the identity of the original source of 
information, nor did they know that this source violated a duty of 
confidentiality or received a personal benefit.129  
At trial, the defendants argued that because there was no evidence 
that they had possessed such knowledge, the government had failed to 
establish tippee liability under Dirks. 130  In response, the government 
claimed that Dirks only required that the “tippee know that the tipper 
disclosed information in breach of a duty,” not that the tippee also know 
that the insider received a personal benefit in exchange for 
information.131 The government further contended that the defendants 
were “sophisticated traders,” and therefore, should have known that 
such information was disclosed by insiders in breach of a fiduciary duty 
and not for a legitimate business purpose.132 The district court agreed 
with this assessment and instructed the jury that the government only 
had to prove that the defendants “must have known that [the insider 
information] was originally disclosed by the insider in violation of a 
duty of confidentiality.” 133  After being convicted by the jury on all 
counts, both defendants appealed the decision on the grounds that the 
government needed to prove that they had the knowledge of the personal 
benefit provided to the tippers under Dirks.134 They further claimed that 
                                                                                                                 
knew of the tipper’s breach, that is, he knew the information was confidential and 
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there was insufficient evidence to prove the tippers received a personal 
benefit in exchange for the disclosed information.135 
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that, under Dirks, it was 
necessary for the government to prove that the tippees knew the breach 
of duty was for a personal benefit. The court reached this conclusion 
because a tippee’s liability is derivative,136 and therefore, a tippee cannot 
be held liable unless the insider breached a fiduciary duty owed to his or 
her clients or organization by receiving a personal benefit “in exchange 
for the disclosure.” 137  The court agreed with the Supreme Court’s 
rejection of “the SEC’s theory that a recipient of confidential 
information (i.e., the tippee) must refrain from trading ‘whenever he 
received inside information from an insider.’”138 As the court explained, 
“insider trading liability is based on breaches of fiduciary duty, not on 
informational asymmetries.”139 Hence, the test established in Newman 
necessitates a showing of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
(1) the corporate insider was entrusted with a fiduciary duty; (2) the 
corporate insider breached his fiduciary duty by (a) disclosing 
confidential information to a tippee (b) in exchange for a personal 
benefit; (3) the tippee knew of the tipper’s breach, that is, he knew 
the information was confidential and divulged for personal benefit; 
and (4) the tippee still used that information to trade in a security or 
tip another individual for personal benefit.140 
The court also held that the benefit must be objective, 
consequential, and represent a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly 
valuable nature; hence, a mere friendship is insufficient to constitute 
personal benefit.141 The decision vacated the convictions and ordered the 
district court to dismiss the indictment with prejudice, in part, because it 
found insufficient evidence to support a pecuniary benefit.142 According 
to the court, tippee knowledge of a breach of the duty of confidentiality, 
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without tippee knowledge of tipper personal benefit, is insufficient to 
impose criminal liability.143 
E.  THE LIMITS OF NEWMAN 
Newman leaves a large gap in its interpretation for potential inside 
traders to escape liability. The Newman decision reaffirmed the personal 
benefit requirement for insider trading convictions and illuminated the 
high evidentiary burden necessary for downstream tippees.144 Prior to 
the holding in Newman, the government had worked to limit the Dirks 
benefit test. For example, it found the test to be satisfied when the tip 
was made in exchange for “maintaining a useful networking contact,”145 
or when it simply entailed “making a gift of information to a friend.”146 
The Newman decision makes it more difficult for the government to win 
in cases where evidence of a pecuniary benefit is not easy to prove, such 
as when reputational benefits are the alleged benefit the tipper received. 
The Newman decision’s tippee-liability formula diverges from 
common federal practice. Rather than allowing tippee knowledge of 
tipper breach of the duty of confidence to satisfy the scienter 
requirement, the Second Circuit requires that the tippee also know of a 
personal benefit that will accrue to the tipper as a result of disclosure. 
Whether this distinction makes any practical difference, however, 
remains somewhat unclear. This is because a court must rely on the 
Dirks objective bases for proving tipper personal benefit in assaying 
tippee knowledge of personal benefit—most notably, evidence of a 
relationship implying a quid quo pro arrangement. 
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Insider Trading Charges Against Downstream Tippees, GIBSON DUNN (Dec. 15, 2014) 
[hereinafter GIBSON DUNN], http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/US-
v-Newman—Second-Circuit-Ruling-Portends-Cho 
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 145. See United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 371 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 146. See SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 291 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 
U.S. 646, 664 (1983)). 
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1.  Newman’s Impact on the Personal Benefit Test 
The Newman court held that the government had presented 
insufficient evidence of “personal benefit,” in part because the insider 
tippers, Rob Ray and Chris Choi, “were not ‘close’ friends” and “were 
merely casual acquaintances” with the first level tippees, Sandy Goyal 
and Hyung Lim. 147  The court, for instance, found the evidence that 
Goyal advised Ray on a variety of career decisions and edited Ray’s 
resume insufficient to show the two had the kind of strong relationship 
that would have supported an inference of a quid pro quo 
arrangement.148 Nevertheless, the court apparently entertained the idea 
that such a showing could be made with different evidence. Hence, 
personal benefit can still—and indeed should under Dirks—be inferred 
where a preexisting relationship between tippee and tipper is sufficiently 
strong. And there is no reason why the same evidence, which would 
support a jury inference beyond a reasonable doubt, would not also be 
sufficient to establish that a tippee knew or should have known the 
tipper disclosed information in order to gain a personal benefit. 
The court establishes that one must have knowledge of the personal 
benefit to the tipper, and know that the trading is based on material, 
nonpublic information. Thereby, the ruling “raises the bar” for the 
remote-tippee prosecutions.149 Still, the holding does not clarify whether 
the showing of the remote tippee consciously avoiding learning of the 
personal benefit would meet the standard. Therefore, the Newman 
standard may lead to more illicit insider trading behavior aimed at 
escaping liability. 
2.  Newman’s Impact on Excuses for Breach 
Similarly, the Newman court also discusses how the investor 
relations departments at NVIDIA and Dell had a habit of disclosing 
material, nonpublic earnings data in advance of quarterly earnings.150 
Because insiders at these companies engaged in this practice for the 
good of the company, the court found it unreasonable to infer that the 
circumstances under which Newman and Chiasson received their tips 
                                                                                                                 
 147. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 452-53. 
 148. Id. at 453. 
 149. GIBSON DUNN, supra note 144, at 3. 
 150. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 454-55; see also GIBSON DUNN, supra note 144, at 1-
2. 
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were enough to support an inference beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
original insider had disclosed in breach of her fiduciary duty.151 But in 
the absence of these special circumstances, such an inference might very 
well have been warranted. In fact, the same evidence used to support a 
jury inference of tipper personal benefit may also support a jury 
inference that the tippee knew or should have known of the personal 
benefit. 
3.  Newman’s Impact on Tipper/Tippee Relationships 
Newman also significantly raises the bar for the kind of relationship 
that will support an inference of a quid pro quo arrangement. In the 
Second Circuit, the government will need to provide “proof of a 
meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that 
is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a 
pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”152 Examples that meet the new 
standard include gifts, access to an investment club where stock tips and 
insight are routinely discussed, close working relationships on real estate 
deals in which parties commonly split commissions on transactions, and 
business referral relationships, such as dental work. 153 In many other 
federal courts, the kinds of relationships evidenced in Newman might 
well have sufficed.154 
F.  THE PURPOSE OF THE DIRKS REQUIREMENT 
The Newman court’s rigid adherence to the personal benefit 
requirement as a necessary element of breach may overlook the reasons 
behind the requirement articulated in Dirks. As noted above, the Court 
                                                                                                                 
 151. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 442, 451, 453-55; see also GIBSON DUNN, supra note 
144, at 3. 
 152. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452. 
 153. See id. at 452-53. 
 154. See, e.g., SEC v. Ingram, 694 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 n. 5 (C.D. Cal. 1988) 
(discussing how an intent to personally benefit may be inferred based on the materiality 
of the information being conferred); SEC v. Blackwell, 291 F. Supp. 2d 673 (S.D. Ohio 
2003) (“A mere allegation that the insider has disclosed material non-public 
information is sufficient to create a legal inference that the insider intended to provide a 
gift to the recipient of the information, thereby establishing the personal benefit 
requirement.”) (citing SEC v. Blackman, No. 3:99-1072, 2000 WL 868770, at *9 (M.D. 
Tenn. May 26, 2000)). 
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in Dirks presented the personal benefit requirement as a test that would 
allow the judiciary to overcome a particular problem. Because there are 
legitimate, reasonable doubt-creating reasons for insider disclosure of 
material, nonpublic information—for example, stimulating the interest 
of potential new financers or stock purchasers, or, as in Dirks, 
whistleblower tipping—the fact of disclosure alone is not enough to 
establish breach. For this reason, the Court introduced the personal 
benefit requirement as a proxy for assaying disclosure (il)legitimacy. 
Where a personal benefit exists, disclosure is presumptively illegitimate, 
and thus deceptive under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Where there is 
no personal benefit, the disclosure must have been made (a) in the 
interest of the principal or (b) negligently, neither of which satisfies the 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5’s scienter requirement.155 
This being the case, if the government can adduce compelling 
evidence that the insider-tipper tipped knowingly (not accidentally) and 
that there is no reasonable explanation as to how tipping might promote 
the best interests of the principal, it then seems unnecessary to insist 
upon evidence of a specific personal benefit. Rather, it would be logical 
under these circumstances to allow a jury to draw the inference that 
disclosure must have been made for personal benefit. This analysis 
would be particularly well supported by Dirks, which allows similar 
inferences to be drawn on the basis of pre-tipping tipper/tippee 
relationships, and which includes the benefit of making a gift of insider 
information to a trading friend or relative as a personal benefit.156 If a 
tippee knows the insider is not tipping negligently, and she knows there 
is no reason to think the tipper’s disclosure will benefit the principal, 
then a jury should be permitted to draw the same inference about the 
tippee: that she knew or should have known that the tipper violated a 
relationship of trust by relaying the principal’s information. 157  For 
example, consider the case where a major stockholder tips investment 
analysts in order to spur favorable reports by the analysts that will lead 
to an upward influence on the price of the stock. 158 In this situation, if 
the tippee knows there is no reason to think that the disclosure is in the 
                                                                                                                 
 155. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 n.23 (1983) (“Scienter . . . is an 
independent element of a Rule 10b-5 violation.”). 
 156. Id. at 664. 
 157. See Blackwell, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 696-97. 
 158. See Analyzing Analyst Recommendations, SEC (Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.se 
c.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm [http://perma.cc/SE74-7MNM]. 
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best interest of the principal, he knows what he is doing is wrong, just 
not precisely how it is wrong. This wrongdoer should not escape justice 
simply because of his perplexity as to how the insider expects to benefit 
from disclosure. 
G.  REFORM PROPOSALS 
As a pushback against the Newman decision, there are now bills 
pending in Congress to define insider trading. The House proposal 
would amend Section 10 of the Exchange Act to outlaw the purchasing 
or selling of “any security, or any securities-based swap agreement, 
based on information that the person knows or, considering factors 
including financial sophistication, knowledge of and experience in 
financial matters, position in a company, and amount of assets under 
management, should know is material information or inside 
information.”159 The proposed legislation defines inside information as 
nonpublic, and obtained “(I) illegally; (II) directly or indirectly from an 
issuer with an expectation of confidentiality or that such information 
will only be used for a legitimate business purposes; or (III) in violation 
of a fiduciary duty.”160 
On the other hand, the Senate bill would amend Section 10(b) to 
make it illegal: 
(A) To purchase, sell, or cause the purchase or sale of any security 
on the basis of material information that the person knows or has 
reason to know is not publicly available. 
(B) To knowingly or recklessly communicate material information 
that the person knows or has reason to know is not publicly available 
to any other person under circumstances in which it is reasonably 
foreseeable that such communication is likely to result in a violation 
of subparagraph (A).161 
The bill does not include “information that the person has 
independently developed from publicly available sources” under the 
“not publicly available” category.162 
                                                                                                                 
 159. Ban Insider Trading Act, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong. § 2(d)(1) (2015). 
 160. Id. § 2(d)(3)(A)(i)-(iii). 
 161. Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong. § 2 (d)(1)(A)-(B) (2015). 
 162. Id. § 2(2). 
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II. THE PARADOX: PENALTIES FOR THE UNDEFINED INSIDER TRADING 
OFFENSE 
As discussed above, neither the SEC nor Congress has defined the 
term “insider trading.” Yet, Congress has established both civil and 
criminal penalties, including fines and prison terms, for engaging in this 
behavior. The various penalties are described below. 
A. CIVIL PENALTIES 
Prior to 1984, federal legislation did not impose civil penalties on 
insider trading. The SEC had to rely on federal court injunctions against 
future violations, as well as disgorgements of profits, to enforce 
securities fraud prohibitions. 163  Although insider trading is not 
statutorily defined, in 1984, Congress enacted the ITSA164 to remedy the 
“inadequate deterrent provided by enforcement remedies for insider 
trading,” noting that neither injunctions nor disgorgement sufficiently 
penalized defendants for insider trading.165 The ITSA amended Section 
21 of the Exchange Act to include, in relevant part, that the SEC: 
may bring an action in a United States district court to seek, and the 
court shall have jurisdiction to impose, a civil penalty [the amount of 
which] shall be determined by the court in light of the facts and 
circumstances, but shall not exceed three times the profit gained or 
loss avoided as a result of such unlawful purchase or sale, and shall 
be payable into the Treasury of the United States.166 
Congress doubled down its efforts when it enacted ITSFEA in 
1988, which expanded the scope of civil penalties on insider trading to 
“controlling” persons, defined as those “who, at the time of the 
violation, directly or indirectly controlled the person who committed 
such violation.”167 Civil penalties for a controlling person are limited to 
                                                                                                                 
 163. See Carole B. Silver, Penalizing Insider Trading: A Critical Assessment of the 
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 1985 DUKE L.J. 960, 960 (1985). 
 164. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264. 
 165. See SEC v. Downe, 969 F. Supp. 149, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting H.R. Rep. 
No. 98-355, at 7-8 (1983). 
 166. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2, 98 Stat. 1264, 
1264. 
 167. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-704, § 3, 102 Stat. 4677, 4678. 
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the greater of $1,000,000 or treble damages. 168  If the “controlled 
person’s violation was a violation by communication, the [damages are] 
deemed to be limited to the profit gained or loss avoided by the person 
or persons to whom the controlled person directed such 
communication.”169 
Empirical evidence provided by Professor Seyhun shows that 
neither ITSA nor ITSFEA was effective in reducing either the volume or 
profitability of insider trading. 170  In fact, following these legislative 
changes, the volume of insider trading increased four-fold, while 
abnormal profitability of insider trading doubled. 171  Insiders did not 
reduce their trading, even on a temporary basis, in response to these 
legislative initiatives. 172  Seyhun concludes that among the possible 
reasons for the ineffectiveness of the increased sanctions are the highly 
stringent requirements for the legally material information.173 
The Securities Act and the Exchange Act also provide for civil 
penalties in other securities fraud contexts. Section 20(d)(1) of the 
Securities Act and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act permit the SEC 
to impose monetary penalties against persons who violate these acts 
“other than by committing a violation subject to a penalty pursuant to 
[Section 21A of the Exchange Act].”174 Both Section 20(d)(1) of the 
Securities Act and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act provide three-
tier penalty systems, where the maximum penalty increases with the 
severity of the violation.175 The Second Circuit recently held that Section 
21A of the Exchange Act is the only basis for ordering civil penalties in 
insider trading cases brought in federal court.176 The court, however, did 
                                                                                                                 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See H. Nejat Seyhun, The Effectiveness of Insider Trading Sanctions, 35 J. 
LAW & ECON. 149 (1992). 
 171. Id. at 150. 
 172. Id. at 176. 
 173. Id. at 177. 
 174. See Exchange Act § 21(d)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(A)(2012); Securities 
Act § 20(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)(1). 
 175. See Exchange Act § 21(d)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(A); Securities Act § 
20(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)(1). 
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2016]     DEFINING "MATERIAL, NONPUBLIC" 357 
not have cause to address the expanded scope of the SEC’s powers 
under the Dodd-Frank Act.177 
The Dodd-Frank Act significantly enhanced the SEC’s enforcement 
powers by (1) granting the SEC the ability to obtain monetary penalties 
in administrative proceedings against all individuals, not just those 
associated with regulated entities, and (2) increasing the civil penalties 
that the SEC can seek in administrative cases. 178  Section 21B, as 
amended, states, in part: 
In any proceeding instituted pursuant to sections [15(b)(4), 15(b)(6), 
15D, 15B, 15C, 15E, or 17A] of this title against any person, the 
[SEC] or the appropriate regulatory agency may impose a civil 
penalty if it finds . . . that such penalty is in the public interest and 
that such person— 
(A) has willfully violated any provision of the Securities Act of 
1933, the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940, or this chapter, or the rules or regulations 
thereunder, or the rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking 
Board; 
(B) has willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, or 
procured such a violation by any other person; 
(C) has willfully made or caused to be made in any application for 
registration or report required to be filed with . . . any . . . appropriate 
regulatory agency under this chapter, or in any proceeding before the 
[SEC] with respect to registration, any statement which was, at the 
time and in the light of the circumstances under which it was made, 
false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or has omitted 
to state in any such application or report any material fact which is 
required to be stated therein; or 
(D) has failed reasonably to supervise, within the meaning of 
[section 15(b)(4)(E)] of this title, with a view to preventing 
violations of the provisions of such statutes, rules and regulations, 
another person who commits such a violation, if such other person is 
subject to his supervision.179 
                                                                                                                 
 177. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111- 203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 178. Id. § 929, 124 Stat. at 1863. 
 179. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–2 
358 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
Section 21B contains civil penalty provisions applicable in 
administrative proceedings similar to those in Section 21(d)(3) for 
judicial proceedings, except notably, Section 21B does not contain the 
“21A” exemption found in Section 21(d)(3).180 The three-tier penalty 
structure under Section 21B also imposes the same maximum penalties 
as the penalty structure of Section 21(d)(3).181 While the applicability of 
Section 21B to insider trading is still the subject of debate,182 the SEC 
has continued using this section to impose civil penalties for insider 
trading in its administrative forum.183 
Additionally, Section 753 of the Dodd-Frank Act expanded the 
“anti-manipulation” authority of the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (“CFTC”) by amending Section 6 of the Commodity 
Exchange Act.184 The amended Section 6(c)(1) is closely modeled after 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, and CFTC Regulation 
180.1, promulgated in accordance with Section 6(c)(1), is the functional 
analog of Rule 10b-5.185 However, the CFTC has recognized that unlike 
securities markets, “derivatives markets have long operated in a way 
that allows for market participants to trade on the basis of lawfully 
obtained material, nonpublic information,”186 and therefore has limited 
the scope of CFTC Regulation 180.1 with regard to insider trading. 
CFTC Regulation 180.1 only prohibits trading based on misappropriated 
information obtained or used in breach of a pre-existing duty. 187 
                                                                                                                 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id.; Exchange Act § 21(d)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(A). 
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Furthermore, the Commission has noted that CFTC Regulation 180.1 
does not create an affirmative duty of disclosure, except such disclosure 
that may be required “as necessary to make any statement made to the 
other person in or in connection with the transaction not misleading in 
any material respect.”188 The CFTC may assess a civil penalty of not 
more than $1 million or triple the monetary gain to the person for each 
violation in any case of manipulation or attempted manipulation.189 
B. CRIMINAL PENALTIES 
Most criminal prosecutions for violations of the federal securities 
laws, including the insider trading provisions, are brought under Section 
24 of the Securities Act and Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act.190 Other 
bases for criminal liability in the insider trading context include the 
federal mail and wire fraud statutes,191 as well as the federal criminal 
offense of securities fraud (enacted as part of SOX).192 Section 24 of the 
Securities Act193  and Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act194  generally 
authorize criminal prosecutions for “willful violations” of provisions, 
rules, or regulations under the respective acts. In the insider trading 
context, the most common bases for criminal liability are violations of 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, although Rule 14e-3 
is also frequently used.195 
Section 24 of the Securities Act provides that any person who 
willfully (1) violates any of the provisions or related rules and 
regulations of the Act, or (2) provides materially false or misleading 
information on a registration statement under the Act, is subject to a 
maximum fine of $10,000, a maximum prison term of five years, or 
                                                                                                                 
information in breach of a pre-existing duty (established by another law or rule, or 
agreement, understanding, or some other source), or by trading on the basis of material 
nonpublic information that was obtained through fraud or deception, may be in 
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 188. 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) (2012). 
 189. Id. § 9(10)(C)(ii). 
 190. See WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING: LIABILITY 
AND COMPLIANCE § 7.02.1 (3d. ed. 2013). 
 191. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1351 (2012). 
 192. See id. § 1348. 
 193. See Securities Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2012). 
 194. See Exchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). 
 195. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2015). 
360 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
both.196 Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act provides that any natural 
person who willfully violates any provision of the Act, other than 
Section 30(A),197 may be subject to a maximum penalty of $5 million, a 
maximum prison term of twenty years, or both.198 A corporation may be 
subject to a fine not exceeding $25 million.199 
One of the primary contributions that SOX made to the insider 
trading statutory scheme was the new criminal securities fraud 
offense. 200  Among other things, the provision makes it unlawful to 
execute or attempt to execute a scheme or artifice to defraud a person in 
connection with any security.201 The statute provides for a fine, a term of 
imprisonment of not more than twenty-five years, or both.202 In 2009, 
the provision was amended by the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act 
of 2009 to extend the criminal penalties to commodities fraud.203 
The DOJ has often relied on the federal mail and wire fraud statutes 
in criminal prosecutions by alleging Rule 10b-5 violations. 204  The 
federal mail and wire fraud statutes prohibit the use of mail or wire, 
radio, or television communications “for the purpose of executing [any] 
scheme or artifice” to defraud.205 Although these statutes may lack teeth 
in most securities fraud prosecutions, in insider trading cases, the wire 
and mail fraud statutes may enable prosecutors to reach conduct outside 
of the scope of Section 10(b).206 For example, under a wire or mail fraud 
                                                                                                                 
 196. See Securities Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x. 
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theory, a crime is complete once a company is defrauded of its 
confidential information regardless of whether the information is used 
by anyone for purposes of trading. Also, the “materiality” required for 
wire and mail fraud may be easier to meet than that of securities 
fraud.207 Wire and mail fraud carry mostly the same statutory penalties 
as a violation of Section 10(b) (with a few exceptions, the most notable 
being if “the violation affects a financial institution”).208 
Although federal judges have the right to impose any sentence for 
insider trading convictions, they are required to keep in mind the 
criminal sentencing guidelines. In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress issued 
directives to the U.S Sentencing Commission to “review and, if 
appropriate, amend” various sentencing guidelines and policy statements 
applicable to fraud offenses. 209  The Sentencing Commission 
promulgated amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for 
securities fraud, which took effect in 2012.210 
The Sentencing Commission adopted a new minimum offense level 
of fourteen (which equates to a recommended prison range of fifteen to 
twenty-one months for defendants with no criminal record)211 for any 
“organized scheme to engage in insider trading.”212 The commentary 
lists factors that courts may consider in determining whether an insider 
trading scheme is “organized” within the meaning of the Act: whether it 
                                                                                                                 
 207. Compare Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting TSC 
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111- 203, § 1079A(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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11, 2011). 
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COMM’N 2014). 
 212. Id. § 2B1.4. 
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involved “considered, calculated, systemic, or repeated efforts to . . . 
trade on insider information, as distinguished from . . . opportunistic 
instances of insider trading.”213 For cases where there is minimal gain 
from insider trading, this will mean an automatic increase of six offense 
levels for all participants in the offense. 214  As the profitability of a 
scheme increases, however, the effect of this new provision diminishes, 
disappearing entirely when the overall gain from the scheme reaches 
$30,000.215 
The amendments to the insider trading guidelines also broadened 
the applicability of the “abuse of trust” enhancement. Previously, a 
defendant received increased punishment under the guidelines if the 
abuse of a position of public or private trust significantly facilitated the 
crime; this provision was not triggered unless the defendant’s position 
was characterized by “substantial discretionary judgment that is 
ordinarily given considerable deference.”216 The amendment loosened 
that requirement by specifying that the enhancement applies if “the 
position of public or private trust . . . contributed in some significant 
way to facilitating the commission or concealment of the offense.”217 
The Sentencing Commission also added a special rule for 
determining loss in cases involving fraudulent inflation or deflation in 
the value of publicly traded securities or commodities.218 The amended 
commentary directs the use of what has become known as the “modified 
rescissory method” for determining actual loss.219 The commentary also 
directs the courts to presume that the modified rescissory method has 
accurately calculated the actual loss, but a party may rebut that 
presumption and persuade the court that it is not a “reasonable estimate 
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under the Sentencing Guidelines chart, equates to a recommended prison term of zero 
to six months. See id. at ch. 5, pt. A. 
 215. Both the pre-2012 amendment and post-2012 amendment guidelines 
recommend a base offense level of 8 for insider trading. See id. at § 2B1.4. 
 216. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2010). 
 217. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 211, at § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1. 
 218. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(ix). 
 219. First, calculate the difference between (i) the average share price during the 
fraud period; and (ii) the average share price during the 90-day period after the fraud 
was disclosed to the market. Second, multiply the difference by the number of shares 
outstanding. See id. 
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of the actual loss.”220 The court may consider, among other factors, the 
extent to which the amount so determined includes significant changes 
in value not resulting from the offense (e.g., changes caused by external 
market forces, such as changed economic circumstances, changed 
investor expectations, and new industry-specific or firm-specific facts, 
conditions, or events).221 
Finally, the Sentencing Commission expanded the provisions in the 
fraud guideline that govern when a judge may depart from the 
recommended guideline range.222 First, the Commission noted that an 
upward departure might be warranted if the offense created a risk of 
substantial loss beyond the loss determined under the guideline, “such as 
a risk of a significant disruption of a national financial market.” 223 
Second, the Commission provided new guidance on downward 
departures, adding the example of a securities fraud where fraudulent 
misrepresentations inflate the price of a stock in a manner that produces 
“an aggregate loss amount that is substantial but diffuse, with relatively 
small loss amounts suffered by a relatively large number of victims.”224 
III. OUR PROPOSAL: A NEW EVIDENTIARY STANDARD 
Many scholars agree that a clear statutory definition of illegal 
insider trading should be established, arguing that it is preferable to 
further judicial interpretation.225 Our proposal for reform is outlined in 
this part. 
A. REQUIREMENTS 
We propose that the government be allowed to establish a prima 
facie case of illegal insider trading on the basis of material, nonpublic 
information when it can prove the following three elements: (1) the 
information giving rise to the trade is of the type that requires an 8-K 
filing by the corporation; (2) its announcement must lead to statistically 
significant, abnormal stock returns; and (3) the putative insider trading 
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must have occurred within two months prior to the announcement of the 
information. 
The first and third requirements are factual and can easily be 
satisfied. The second requirement can be satisfied by following a similar 
procedure described in this part. Given that corporations file 10-Q and 
10-K reports every three months, these conditions in effect require that 
all insider trading be confined to approximately a one-month window 
after each earnings announcement.226 If all three conditions are satisfied, 
then the burden of proof must be on insiders to show that their particular 
transaction does not meet the material, nonpublic information 
requirement. Similarly, any trades made by individuals receiving tips 
from insiders (on any information satisfying the three conditions above) 
must also shift the burden of proof, in this case, to the tippee(s) accused 
of committing securities fraud. 
We expect additional clarity will allow all insiders who want to be 
on the safe side of the law to ensure that their transactions do not meet 
any of the conditions set forth above. Insiders already know which 
events trigger an 8-K filing. By not trading or tipping during the two-
month window preceding an upcoming 8-K filing, insiders can easily 
ensure that at least two of the three conditions will not be satisfied. The 
benefit of this additional clarity should enable courts to separate routine 
insider trading from opportunistic trading and increase the confidence in 
the public equity markets. 
B. 8-K FILING REQUIREMENTS 
Form 8-K is a broad form used to notify investors of any material 
event that is important to shareholders or the SEC.227 The SEC usually 
considers an event to be material when “there is a substantial likelihood 
that a reasonable investor would consider the information important to 
making an investment decision.”228 It is one of the most common forms 
                                                                                                                 
 226. Typically, one week after earnings announcements is also considered an 
additional black-out period to allow to markets to fully digest the earnings information. 
This in effect confines insider trading (on information contained in the forms) to 
between weeks one and four after each earnings announcement. 
 227. Form 8-K, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
4AQJ-HKAL]. 
 228. Investor Bulletin: How to Read an 8-K, SEC, at 1 (May 2012) [hereinafter 
Investor Bulletin], http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/readan8k.pdf [http://perma.cc/53T 
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filed with the SEC and supplements the public companies’ annual 
reports on Form 10-K and quarterly reports on Form 10-Q. Public 
companies are required to file the Form under the Exchange Act. These 
reports are available to the public on the SEC’s EDGAR website.229 
Form 8-K is used for reports under Section 13 or 15(d) of the 
Exchange Act and filed pursuant to Rule 13a-11 or Rule 15d-11, as well 
as for reports of nonpublic information required to be disclosed by 
Regulation FD.230 Form 8-K may be used to satisfy the filing obligations 
under (1) Exchange Act Rule 230.425 for written communications 
relating to business combination transactions; (2) Exchange Act Rule 
240.14a-12 for soliciting materials and pre-commencement 
communications for tender offers; (3) for pre-commencement 
communications under Rule 240.14d-2(b); or (4) for pre-commencement 
communications under Rule 240.13e-4(c).231 
Triggering events apply to registrants and subsidiaries.232 Form 8-K 
consists of nine sections. Under Section 1, a company is required to file 
the Form when it (1) enters a “material definitive agreement;” (2) 
terminates such an agreement; (3) is in bankruptcy or receivership; or 
(4) receives official reports of shutdowns and patterns of violations in 
mine safety.233  
Item 1.01 requires a disclosure of material agreements not made in 
the ordinary course of business, or any material amendments to those. A 
material definitive agreement can be both written and oral.234 Taking out 
a loan with a bank or signing a long-term lease would require this 
disclosure, but signing a lease for an additional store when the retailer 
already has a chain would not. If the agreement was not material at the 
time the registrant entered into it, but becomes material later, the 
registrant does not need to file Form 8-K. In either case, the registrant is 
required to file the agreement as an exhibit to the periodic report in the 
                                                                                                                 
5-8ZYL]. 
 229. EDGAR, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html 
[http://perma.cc/CVK9-EUME]. 
 230. See Form 8-K, supra note 227, at 1. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Division of Corporate Finance: Current Report on Form 8-K Frequently Asked 
Questions, SEC (Nov. 23, 2004) [hereinafter FAQ], http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpf 
in/form8kfaq.htm [http://perma.cc/T5B6-CCYC ]. 
 233. Fast Answers: Form 8-K, SEC [hereinafter Fast Answers], http://www.sec.gov/ 
answers/form8k.htm [http://perma.cc/GA48-4N73]. 
 234. See FAQ, supra note 232. 
366 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
period in which the agreement became material. 235  Furthermore, the 
registrant must file Form 8-K if an agreement is not “immaterial in 
amount or significance” within the meaning of Item 601(b)(10)(iii)(A) 
of Regulation S-K, unless it is not required to be disclosed under Item 
601(b)(10)(iii)(C).236 This issue is considered from the perspective of a 
reasonable investor and within established standards of materiality.237  
Item 1.02 requires disclosure of a termination of an agreement prior 
to the established expiration, but not of an agreement that expires under 
its terms. Once notice of termination is received, Form 8-K is required, 
even if the registrant intends to negotiate and in good faith believes that 
the agreement has not been terminated.238 Importantly, the triggering 
event is the notice, not the termination of the agreement.239 Under Item 
1.03, the registrant may include the company’s plan for Chapter 11 
reorganization or Chapter 7 liquidation, and the court’s confirmation of 
the plan.240 
Under Section 2, a company must report in Form 8-K when (1) it 
completes transactions acquiring or disposing of assets; (2) it makes 
public announcements of its operations and financial condition; (3) 
liabilities arise under a direct financial obligation or under an off-
balance sheet arrangement; (4) triggering events occur that accelerate or 
increase a direct financial obligation or an obligation under an off-
balance sheet arrangement; (5) its executives commit the company to 
certain exit or disposal activities; and (6) its executives decide that 
material impairments to its assets are required.241  
Item 2.01 requires a company to disclose any time a significant 
amount of assets are acquired or disposed, such as when a company 
buys or merges with another company, or sells a business unit.242 If a 
merger results in a “shell company”243 becoming a company in its own 
right, the registrant would provide investors with information about this 
                                                                                                                 
 235. See Investor Bulletin, supra note 228, at 1. 
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 237. Id. 
 238. See FAQ, supra note 232. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Investor Bulletin, supra note 228, at 2. 
 241. Id. at 2-3. 
 242. Id. 
 243. The SEC defines a “shell company” as “a company that either has little or no 
operations or has little or no assets other than cash and cash equivalents.” Id. at 2. 
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company under this item. Under Item 2.02, the company usually 
summarizes the full financial statement, which often appears later in the 
company’s quarterly report or annual report. The company often 
simultaneously announces these results in a press release and a Form 8-
K. Item 2.03 requires disclosure of the basic terms of material financial 
obligations, including long-term debt and capital or operating leases, as 
well as short-term debt beyond the ordinary course of business. Any 
material financial obligations arising out of off-balance sheet 
arrangements, whether direct or contingent, must also be disclosed.244 
The materiality of the financial obligation is “a facts and circumstances 
determination.”245  
Item 2.04 requires the disclosure of any event that triggers the 
acceleration or increase of a financial obligation as long as the event is 
material, such as defaults on loans. In the case of a loan default where 
the company must pay the entire amount owed, the company must 
disclose the amount to be repaid, the terms of such repayment, and other 
financial obligations that may have to be repaid on different terms as 
result of the initial default. Item 2.05 requires disclosure of restructuring 
plans where the company would incur material charges, such as the 
decision to close some of its stores or lay off workers. Under this 
provision, the company must also disclose cost estimates when it is able 
to determine them.246 Lastly, under Item 2.06, a company must disclose 
write-downs, otherwise known as impairments. These occur when a 
company significantly lowers its estimates of the value of some assets.247 
If the impairment is determined routinely as the company prepares its 
financial statements for its periodic report, then the company may make 
the disclosure in the periodic report, and not in a Form 8-K.248 
Under Section 3, a company must file Form 8-K when it (1) 
receives a notice of delisting, transfer of listing, or failure to meet listing 
rules or standards; (2) makes an unregistered sale of equity securities; or 
(3) materially modifies the rights of its security holders. Under Item 
3.01, a company must disclose if the stock exchange notifies the 
company that it can no longer be listed. If the company has a grace 
period to return to compliance, it must disclose any steps it will take to 
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avoid delisting. Item 3.02 mandates public companies to disclose private 
sales of securities above 1% of its outstanding shares of that class (or 
5% for smaller reporting companies). Public offerings registered with 
the SEC, however, do not need to be disclosed. Under Item 3.03, 
companies are required to disclose material changes to instruments that 
define the rights of shareholders or material restrictions on the rights of 
security holders resulting from the issuance or modification of another 
class of securities, such as loan terms restricting dividend payments, 
adoption of an antitakeover device, or issuance of preferred stock.249 
Under Section 4, matters related to accountants and financial 
statements, such as (1) changes in the company’s certifying accountant, 
or (2) decisions to no longer rely on the company’s previously issued 
financial statements, must also be filed. Public companies must disclose 
if they dismiss their independent auditor, if she resigns or declines to 
stand for re-appointment, or if the company hires a new auditor. As the 
SEC notes in its Investor Bulletin,250 a change in auditors may be a red 
flag for investors. Therefore, companies must disclose three major 
events if they occurred in the previous two fiscal years. First, a company 
must disclose whether the departing auditor gave an adverse or qualified 
opinion on the company’s statements. Second, it must disclose 
disagreements it had with the departing auditor over accounting 
principles or practices, financial statements, or the scope or procedure of 
the audit. Finally, it must disclose whether the former auditor advised 
the company that (a) “the necessary internal controls to prepare reliable 
financial statements do not exist;” (b) “the auditor can no longer rely on 
management’s representations or is unwilling to be associated with the 
financial statements prepared by management;” (c) “the auditor believed 
it should further investigate a matter or significantly expand the scope of 
its audit, and the author did not do so;” or (d) “the auditor has found new 
information that materially impacts the fairness or reliability of current 
or prior financial statements, and the issue has not been resolved to the 
auditor’s satisfaction.”251  
Item 4.02 requires a disclosure of any error in the previously issued 
financial statements to establish that these should not be relied upon. 
Additionally, a company must disclose if the auditor believes that the 
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previously-issued audit reports or interim reviews of these statements 
should not be relied upon. The company must demonstrate whether its 
audit committee, full board, or authorized executive officers have 
discussed the issue with the auditor.252 
Section 5 discusses corporate governance and management. A 
company must file Form 8-K when there are (1) changes in control of 
the company; (2) departures of directors or certain officers, board 
elections, appointments of certain officers, and changes in compensatory 
arrangements of certain officers; (3) amendments to the company’s 
articles of incorporation or bylaws, or changes in its fiscal year; (4) 
temporary suspensions of trading under the company’s employee benefit 
plans; (5) amendments to the company’s Code of Ethics, or waivers of 
any provisions of the Code of Ethics; (6) changes from shell-company to 
non-shell-company status; (7) submissions of issues to security-holder 
vote; and (8) shareholder nominations of directors.  
Under Item 5.01, the company must disclose an event where there 
is a change of control of the company, by identifying the persons 
acquiring the control and the percentage of voting securities they now 
possess, any arrangements between the previous and new control groups 
relating to election of directors, or other important issues.253 In the event 
that a board member resigns or will not stand for re-election due to 
disagreement with the company over its operations, policies, or 
practices, or a director is removed for cause from the board, the 
company has an obligation to disclose the circumstances of the 
disagreement under Item 5.02.254 If there is a letter from the director to 
this effect, the letter must be filed as an exhibit. In the event that a high-
level executive officer retires, resigns, or is terminated, or alternatively 
that a new officer is appointed, the company must disclose this fact 
along with any related compensation arrangements. Any changes to the 
compensation of the current high-level officers must also be 
disclosed. 255  Unless the company already disclosed the proposed 
amendments or fiscal year change in a proxy or information statement, 
the company must disclose any amendments to its articles of 
incorporation or bylaws, or changes to its fiscal year under Item 5.03. It 
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should be noted that companies that issue only debt securities are 
usually exempted from this item. 256   
Under Item 5.05, companies are required to report any changes to 
their code of ethics or waivers that apply to the CEO, CFO, CAO, 
controller, or others performing similar duties. Companies may elect to 
disclose this information on their website instead of filing Form 8-K.257 
Under Item 5.07, companies are required to file the results of the 
shareholder votes in director elections and on all other issues put to a 
vote within four business days of the end of an annual or special 
meeting. If such results are unavailable at the time, companies are 
required to file preliminary results and an amended Form 8-K with final 
vote results within four business days of those results being available.258 
Under Section 6, a public company must disclose any (1) asset-
backed securities (ABS) “informational and computational material,” (2) 
change in Regulation AB Item 1108(a)(2) servicer or trustee, (3) change 
in credit enhancement or other support as specified in Regulation AB, 
(4) failure to make any required distribution to holders of the ABS, or 
(5) “Securities Act Updating Disclosure.”259 
Section 7 discusses Regulation FD disclosure. The purpose of this 
regulation is to “prevent companies from selectively disclosing material, 
nonpublic information.”260 Generally, companies are required to disclose 
material information to the public at the same time as it is provided to 
others, including securities market professionals. Companies may 
submit Form 8-K under this Item or Item 8.01 to comply with the 
Regulation FD’s public disclosure requirement. Disclosures include 
announcements of dividends, quarterly sales of figures, etc.261 
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Section 8 is a catchall section where the registrant company can 
report events that are not specifically called for by Form 8-K, but that it 
nevertheless considers important to security holders. Finally, Section 9 
discusses financial statements and exhibits that a company may be 
required to furnish to supplement other parts of Form 8-K. 
A report must be filed or furnished within four business days262 of 
the occurrence of the event for items in Sections 1 through 6, and 9. If 
the form is furnished only to satisfy its obligation under Regulation FD, 
the due date may be earlier.263 If a triggering event occurs within four 
business days before the company’s filing of a periodic report, it may be 
disclosed in that periodic report instead of filing of Form 8-K, unless it 
is required under Item 4.01 or Item 4.02.264 
IV. EXPLOITATION OF VAGUENESS IN STANDARDS: PROFITABILITY OF 
INSIDERS’ TRANSACTIONS 
Given the vagueness of the insider trading laws, insiders have been 
able to exploit material, nonpublic information by buying and selling the 
shares of their firms prior to the public dissemination of this information 
through Form 8-K filings, without facing legal consequences. To test 
our hypothesis, we obtained stock price information from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (“CRSP”). The insider trading data comes 
from the union of the Thomson Reuters Insider Filing Data Feed (1996 
to 2013) and backward extensions using archived annual purchases from 
the National Archives (1975 to 1995) (collectively, the “combined 
Insider Trading Database”). Our sample includes United States common 
stocks (CRSP share codes of 10 or 11) that are covered by all three 
databases. The period is from January 1975 through December 2013. 
We restrict attention to this interval due to the availability of insider 
trading data, which first became available in January of 1975. We 
include observations beginning only from the time when the firms first 
appear in the combined Insider Trading Database. Following 
Shumway, 265  we adjust stock returns for delistings using the CRSP 
delisting file. Our final dataset has over 20,000 unique CUSIPs and over 
3,500,000 observations. 
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The combined Insider Trading Database includes all trades reported 
to the SEC-Ownership Reporting System. The data contains all open 
market purchases and sales by officers, directors, and beneficial owners 
(direct or indirect owners of more than 10% of any equity class of 
securities) of publicly traded firms.266 Shares acquired through exercise 
of options, stock awards, and trades with corporations are excluded. The 
final sample is limited to firms for which stock return data is available in 
CRSP. Finally, in order to deal with potential misreports and incorrect 
outliers, three filters are used. On the insider transaction date, (1) the 
insider transaction price must be less than twice the closing price of the 
stock, (2) the number of shares of the insider transactions must be less 
than the daily volume of trade of the stock, and (3) the number of shares 
of the insider transaction must be less than the outstanding number of 
shares for the stock.267 
We measure the profitability of insider trades starting from the 
insider trade date. We measure abnormal stock return behavior using the 
cumulative market-adjusted abnormal daily stock returns (CAR) starting 
from the trade date (date 0) for a period of T days: 
 
 
 
 
where Hi,t takes the value 1 for insider purchases and -1 for insider sales. 
Thus, we define an insider purchase to be abnormally profitable if the 
stock price outperforms the general stock market after the purchase. 
Similarly, we define an insider sale to be abnormally profitable if the 
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stock price underperforms the general stock market after the sale. The 
variable  is the cum-dividend return to stock i for day t, and  is 
the cum-dividend return to the CRSP equally-weighted portfolio of all 
New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ 
stocks for day t. We examine the profitability of insider trades for T = 5, 
10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 days following insiders’ transactions.  
To focus on insider transactions that are likely to be based on 
material, nonpublic information, we first require that the abnormal 
profitability (CAR) of insiders’ transactions exceed 5% by day 5, 10, 20, 
30, 40 and 50. The results using insider trading data for the last 40 years 
are shown in Table 1. 
 
 
Our evidence shows that a significant portion of insider 
transactions exhibits immediate profitability. During the decade of 1975 
to 1984, over 60,000 transactions showed almost immediate abnormal 
profitability by beating the general stock market more than 5% during 
the first 5 days after the trade date. Given the quick stock price reaction 
and immediate profitability, these translations are likely to be based on 
material, nonpublic insider information. By day 50, the proportion of 
highly profitable transactions rises to about 40% of all trades by 
insiders. 
Over the next three decades, the number of transactions with 
immediate abnormal profitability steadily rose. In the most recent 
decade of 2005 to 2014, over 200,000 large-volume transactions show 
immediate profitability by day 5. The number of transactions that 
showed significant abnormal profitability by day 50 exceeded 500,000 
tir , tmr ,
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during this decade, again constituting about 35% of all trades by 
insiders. 
As a second test of materiality, we require that profitability of 
insider trades exceed 10% within 5 days after trade. These results are 
shown in Table 2. The overall sample period shows that there were more 
than 190,000 such transactions. By day 50, the number of highly-
profitable transactions approaches 1,000,000. These highly profitable 
transactions constitute about 27% of all insider trades. 
 
 
The average abnormal profitability of these selected insider 
transactions is shown in Table 3. Within 5 days after insiders’ trade, 
insiders’ average abnormal profit reaches about 17% for the entire 
sample period, and rising further to about 20% by day 50. The average 
abnormal profits for this highly profitable sample appear to be stable 
over the past four decades. 
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To compute the statistical significance of our findings, we 
compared the statistical distribution of actual insiders’ abnormal profits 
with the hypothetical distribution of insider transactions had insiders not 
traded on material, nonpublic information. To generate the hypothetical 
distribution, we took the actual insider transactions and then randomized 
the date of trade as well as the purchase/sale indicator using a random 
number generator. About 53% of actual insider transactions show 
abnormal profitability while exactly 50% of the randomly generated 
hypothetical trades show abnormal profitability. This difference is 
statistically significant at the 1% level and translates to over 100,000 
transactions for our sample. 
We also repeated this exercise for large transactions involving 
10,000 or more shares. In this case, the difference grew to 4% (54% 
versus 50%), which is again statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Finally, we repeated this exercise for large transactions involving 10,000 
or more shares by top executives. In this case, the difference grew to 4% 
to 6% for various holding periods (54% to 56% for actual trades versus 
50% for hypothetical trades), which is again statistically significant at 
the 1% level. 
The fact that tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of 
additional trades exhibit high abnormal profitability demonstrates that 
the congressional approach of leaving the definition of illegal insider 
information purposefully vague is not working. To the contrary, our 
evidence indicates that insiders are taking advantage of this vagueness in 
the law to exploit their material, nonpublic information. We suggest that 
Congress take this opportunity to define the boundaries of what 
constitutes material, nonpublic and therefore illegal insider trading 
information. 
CONCLUSION 
The forty-year time period from 1975 to 2014 that we investigated 
has seen a number of changes in insider trading laws. While Congress 
continually increased civil and criminal penalties for insider trading, it 
kept the definition of material, nonpublic information purposefully 
vague. The 1984 ITSA established a civil penalty up to three times the 
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profit or loss avoided for both insiders as well as tippers.268 The 1988 
ITSFA provided for private right of action for contemporaneous trading, 
a bounty program to collect up to 10% of the insiders’ illegal profits, 
while also increasing the maximum penalties for violations of insider 
trading laws to $1 million in fines and ten years in prison.269 Finally, 
SOX further increased the penalties for purposeful violations of the 
insider trading laws to $5 million in fines and prison sentences up to 
twenty years.270 As our evidence establishes, none of these increases in 
penalties have been successful in even slowing down profitable insider 
trading. 
The recent Second Circuit decision in Newman represents a step 
backward in clarifying what is material, nonpublic information and 
should be reversed. According to Newman, establishing tippee liability 
under Section 10b of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 of the SEC 
requires tippee knowledge of tipper personal benefit. The Second Circuit 
interprets the Supreme Court’s decision in Dirks stringently,271 reversing 
the trend in the federal judiciary over the past 30 years of allowing the 
Dirks personal benefit requirement to be satisfied by proof that (1) the 
tippee knew the insider-tipper breached a fiduciary-like duty 272  in 
disclosing confidential information, and (2) that the insider expected to 
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 271. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983) (holding that derivative (tippee) 
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breach.”). In Dirks, the insider-tipper shared personal information with an analyst (the 
defendant) in order to expose an insurance scam being perpetrated by the tipper’s 
company. Id. 
 272. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (describing the 
relevant duty as a “fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence”); Donna 
M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 1315, 1337-340 (2009) (discussing the tendency among courts to base insider 
trading liability on breaches of duties that fall outside the (typically) more narrow 
confines of traditional fiduciary duties). 
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obtain a personal benefit in exchange for disclosure.273 Moreover, apart 
from expounding a strict interpretation of the elements needed to 
establish tippee liability, the Newman court also set surprisingly high 
evidentiary standards for proving these elements. 
The combination of these legal and evidentiary adjustments to the 
Dirks test could have serious implications for the government’s efforts 
to deter insider trading. The reason for this is quite simple: when 
potential tippees know they can trade on confidential information 
without recourse, so long as they are careful to receive that information 
from “a friend of a friend of [a friend],”274 they can easily circumvent 
liability, which will give rise to informal information sharing 
networks.275 By habitually sharing inside information with friends and 
associates, insiders could easily engage in indirect, mutual-back-
scratching relationships, disclosing valuable information to the network 
in the hope that similarly situated individuals “three and four levels 
removed from the inside tipper”276 will reciprocate. Such arrangements 
could lead to significant increases in insider trading activity, thereby 
exacerbating the practice’s primary consequences: the unfair transfer of 
wealth from ordinary investors to insider traders and the diminution of 
the public’s confidence and participation in securities markets.277 This, 
                                                                                                                 
 273. See Avi Weitzman et al., Second Circuit Injects New Life into Dirks Personal 
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KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Nov. 11, 2009, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/ 
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BJRV]; see also Weitzman et al., supra note 273, at 3 (explaining how previous insider 
trading cases considered the ability to maintain networking contacts by disclosing 
inside information to be a considerable “reputational benefit,” a benefit that typically 
satisfied the Dirks personal benefit requirement). 
 276. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 443. 
 277. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (noting that, where 
insider trading goes unregulated, “investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital 
[into the] market”). 
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in turn, would likely promote less efficient allocations of investor capital 
and reduced liquidity in the financial sector. 278  Considering these 
negative consequences, it is imperative that the legal community find 
ways to circumvent the constraints Newman imposes on prosecutors. 
This Article puts forth a solution, identifying evidence that could 
demonstrate a tippee’s knowledge of tipper benefit without requiring 
actual knowledge of the confidential information’s source. By using the 
Form 8-K filing as a proxy for tippee knowledge of tipper breach of 
duty and personal benefit, this approach puts tippees on notice that the 
specific information has been disclosed contrary to law and in violation 
of fiduciary duties. Because there should be no legitimate business 
purpose for disclosing such information without filing a Form 8-K, the 
failure to file should also be strong enough circumstantial evidence to 
support an inference that the tipper has shared confidential information 
in order to secure a personal benefit. This is because no rational insider 
would assume the liability risk associated with such a disclosure if she 
did not expect to benefit from it. This evidentiary presumption is not 
only consistent with Newman and other insider trading cases, but it also 
promises to significantly expand the ability of prosecutors to bring cases 
against putative insider traders. Moreover, this approach exemplifies 
how similar evidentiary presumptions might be employed to bridge the 
“knowledge gap” that now makes it so difficult—and under Newman 
practically impossible—to establish downstream tippee liability. 
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